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In a recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Yale law professor
Samuel Moyne laments the failures of “judicialized progressivism.”1 Moyn
calls for law school reforms to address the fact that they no longer produce
sufficient “liberal results” to make their training consistent with elite students’
social justice ideals.2 The goal of making law schools “staging grounds for
social change” undermining “unjustifiable hierarchies” requires, in Moyne’s
view, that law schools train lawyers to “demystify” the “rule of law” (a phrase
Moyne himself uses only ironically) to show its “disservice to the interests of
ordinary people.”3 Moyne sees such work as humbling for lawyers because it
questions the legitimacy of the meritocracy at whose apex they supposedly sit.
It seems more accurate to say that it places those lawyers who choose his path
above the meritocracy itself, condemning not their own status, but rather the
legal order.4 The clear implication is that the moral choice for members of the
legal profession in both practice and academia is to disrupt legal conventions
and structures in the name of greater social justice. Is this the proper attitude
and goal for lawyers? My contention here is that this attitude has served to
undermine and even cause us to forget certain fundamental truths regarding law.
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1. Samuel Moyn, Law Schools are Bad for Democracy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.
(December
16,
2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Are-Badfor/245334?key=1brOtA2hhki0d3uawry_7keKLKkePsVzDJMg51ZD2KJK4l8zeJVeGfM04AyDnaHQkFYRWdhclZTWWRvZFZEVVZ.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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These truths include the following: First, for every society, “order is the first
need of all.”5 People require sustained, consistent rules governing their
interactions in order to go about their lives in peace. Those most relevant are
the fundamental, grounding norms, such as promises must be kept, especially
when memorialized in contracts, and the state must be looked to primarily as the
enforcer of settled rules; these norms make peace and civil government
possible.6 Classical liberal thinkers argued that the only alternative to general
enforcement of such norms is return to a pre-political “state of nature.”7 Even
the radical Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who yearned for such a return,
acknowledged that it would involve destruction of social order and, with it,
civilization.8
Second, the laws we all must follow are not and cannot be perfect in any sense;
they cannot be perfectly rational, wise, effectual, or just. As products of flawed
human beings, both laws and legal procedures are liable to mistake and even ill
will, such that tragedy and injustice will stalk all that we do, even in the halls of
justice. The process always will be imperfect; the law always will miss the mark
of pure justice.9
Third, as an inescapable consequence of these two basic truths and their
effects on daily life, there always will be a danger of illegitimacy to the law, and
hence order in society. At the very least, political institutions require a Weberian
brand of political legitimacy whereby the people’s beliefs or confidence lends
authority to those in positions of power sufficient for them to rule.10 Should the
people, or even a substantial part thereof, come to believe that the laws are
merely expressions of power, that they are tools of some ruling class with no
inclination to serve the common good, social trust will disintegrate. Law and
social order will soon follow, leading to either revolution or chaos, in which only
force and fraud can rule.11

5. See RUSSEL KIRK, ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER (3d. ed., Regnery, 1991).
6. The first proposition is the foundation of Thomas Hobbes’ theory of social organization.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 79–88 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 1994). The second
proposition is John Locke’s justification and explanation for the formation of civil government.
See JOHN LOCK, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–14 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett 1980).
7. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 6, at 106. Hobbes calls the state of nature a “condition of
war” upon which the commonwealth is a “restraint.” Id.
8. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Essay on the Origins of Inequality, in ROUSSEAU’S
POLITICAL WRITINGS 55 (Julia Conaway Bondanella trans., Alan Ritter & Julia Conaway
Bondanella eds., Norton 1988) (1754).
9. See infra discussion of Augustine, below.
10. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 34 (Rodney
Livingstone trans., David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Hackett 2004).
11. As remarked by Russell Kirk,”[t]he good society is marked by a high degree of order,
justice, and freedom. Among these, order has primacy: for justice cannot be enforced until a
tolerable civil social order is attained, nor can freedom be anything better than violence until order
gives us laws.” KIRK, supra note 5, at 6.
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My contention is that lawyers have willfully forgotten these truths. The how
and why are as simple as they are contested: many lawyers, both secular and
religious, prefer to practice law as political advocacy because in this way they
can see themselves as warriors for social justice. Unfortunately, their practice
rests on deliberate ignorance of law’s nature as a flawed, limited, but necessary
tool for maintaining order, rather than a means of making society truly, fully
just. Consistently denied success in their utopian endeavors, lawyers respond
not by rethinking those endeavors, but by calling into question the legitimacy of
law. Some might consider the motivating factor here to be disappointment or
righteous anger. It seems more accurate, however, to see it as a dangerous,
overweening pride causing one to refuse to rethink one’s own presuppositions
in light of experience. The antidote to this problem is a resuscitation of that old
Christian virtue of humility. Here I begin with a brief discussion of the nature
of humility as a virtue. I proceed to examine the radical critique of law in its
most overtly political, secular forms. I then lay out the elements of radical
political theology which I argue undergird radical legal critiques of both secular
and religious varieties. I proceed to a more detailed discussion of the political
theology provided by the radical (and much beloved) Catholic lawyer Thomas
Shaffer. In the section that follows I use the work of Saint Augustine, as well as
observations on the nature and limits of law taken from legal practice, to show
the intrinsic weaknesses of Shaffer’s perspective and its secular offshoots. I then
build on this critique through an examination, perhaps surprisingly, of the
practical necessity of humility assumed by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (MPRC). I close with some observations on the necessity of Christian
attitudes and virtues to encourage humility and the humble but necessary
lawyerly task of helping people get on with their lives without disturbing
fundamental social peace.
I. THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY
All persons and professions need virtue. The ancient Greek philosopher
Aristotle pointed out that a virtue in an important sense is merely an excellence.12
The virtue of the eye is to see well, and the virtue of a war horse is to carry its
owner into battle without flinching.13 Virtues are not merely discrete good
things, however; they are elements making up a good eye, a good horse, or a
good person. For persons in particular, this means virtue is what enables us to
lead good lives.
Concern with human virtue is concern with morality—with the pursuit of what
is good in the sense of fulfilling the person’s nature as a moral being. To fulfill
one’s nature is to act (and not merely to think) well. One becomes a good person
by acting well; just as one more specifically becomes a good carpenter by

12. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 30 (Roger Crisp trans. and ed., Cambridge, 2000).
13. Id.
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practicing the building of bookshelves and the like with the discipline and care
necessary to perform well at such tasks.14 Virtues are habits of conduct that lead
us to excellence in our endeavors, within the bounds set by that great virtue,
justice.15
All of this may sound quite divorced from the seemingly passive and retiring
practice of humility. Aristotle himself did not even see humility as a virtue.
Instead, Aristotle praised “greatness of soul.”16 This greatness of soul was the
golden mean between vanity and pusillanimity—between excessive pride,
especially in one’s looks or other superficial qualities, and timidity, lack of spirit,
or simple cowardice. Humility may seem to be a somewhat peculiar kind of
virtue because it is rooted in restraint. Courage and justice, for example, clearly
are about developing one’s inner capacities—about expressing and building
upon inner strengths in an outward fashion. Humility, on the other hand, is a
virtue rooted in a Christian conception of the person and moral action. It may
be seen as similar to another cardinal virtue, temperance.17 Both these virtues
have as much to do with restraining as expressing oneself. Humility requires
other-directedness, recognition of one’s own limits, the legitimacy of authority
and existing structures, and the worth of other people and other people’s
opinions.
None of this means that humility is self-abnegation; its roots lie in a realistic
assessment of one’s own worth and a willingness to give credit where it is due
and to listen to others. Humility provides a path to effective common action and
success, and that path is built on respect for the goals and values of other people,
our own limits, and the authority of overarching values and institutions.
Greatness of spirit may be seen as best capturing the crusading lawyer’s vision
of what he or she ought to be. But humility, a somewhat more modest virtue,
better captures the disposition most helpful to the law (as a system especially),
to clients, and to the profession. At the very least, it is regrettable that lawyers
have lost sight of the necessity of humility as a core element in their own proper
disposition.
II. THE SECULAR CRITIQUE
Rejection of humility is of a piece with rejection of the law as it exists. By
this I do not mean that one lacks virtue any time one questions any law, perceives
its imperfections, or seeks to improve it. To seek justice is itself virtuous.
Moreover, the law always is less than perfect. Saint Thomas Aquinas, for

14. Id. at 23.
15. For a recent formulation of the practices in which virtues are formed, see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187 (3d ed. 1981).
16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 68–69.
17. So much is the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA 1a 2ae q. 61 a. 2-3 847–48 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1981).
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example, pointed out that all particular human laws contain elements of
injustice. But he also observed that an unjust law is crooked, or misses the mark
of fulfilling its proper nature, which is to bring justice.18 That is, the problem is
not that law lacks the virtue of justice, but that all human laws, being the products
of sinful humans, fail to embody fully the virtue of justice. One may see pride
as a necessary spur to reform and improve particular laws (thus, Aristotle’s
preference for greatness).19 My point, here, is that lawyers in recent decades
have so vigorously worked to undermine law and our legal structures as to place
themselves above the law, delegitimizing this essential social good.
The radicalism of contemporary legal critiques seems self-evident.
Academics in particular condemn law today, not as imperfect, but as
systemically “racist, sexist, and homophobic.”20 In the classroom, Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) are among the most obvious
examples of theories positing the illegitimacy of the American (and Western)
legal system.21 But CLS and CRT build on a lengthy practice of radical
lawyering rooted in an earlier form of ideology denying our legal system’s
legitimacy.
Before CLS and CRT gained prominence, various forms of radical lawyering,
generally associated with Marxist critiques of the American system, already
were well ensconced among academics and the crusading progressive bar. One
may take, for example, the career of Monroe Freedman. As both academic (seen
during his day as the dean of professional responsibility teachers)22 and activist
legal practitioner, Freedman presented a thoroughgoing critique of American
law and a determination to take radical steps to protect the power and autonomy
of clients. Central to Freedman’s career was his conviction that lawyers should
actively engage in furthering their clients’ lies as a means of increasing the
autonomy of those he deemed oppressed and of undermining what he saw as the
illegitimate power structures of our society.23 According to Freedman, law is
power, and those who face the power of what he saw as a class-based structure

18. BRUCE P. FROHNEN & GEORGE W. CAREY, CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND THE RISE
OF QUASI-LAW 37–38 (2016).
19. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 68–69.
20. This is far from a marginal position within the legal academy. See Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L. J. 1515, 1519 (1919) (noting that it is normal for
law school faculty to have at least “one, but not more than one” scholar of CLS).
21. For an introduction to CRT, see Introduction in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii–xxxii (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller & Thomas eds., 1995); for an
example of CLS, see Aaron Samsel, Toward a Synthesis: Law as Organizing, 18 CUNY L. REV. 375
(2015) (encouraging the use of law to undo systems of “oppression”).
22. Norman I. Silber, Monroe Freedman and the Morality of Dishonesty: Multidimensional
Legal Ethics as a Cold War Imperative, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1127–28 (2016).
23. Id. at 1152–53.
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of oppression deserve to be aided in their struggle for autonomy, including by
furthering perjury.24
Freedman exemplified his political orientation when he wrote in defense of
the nineteenth-century British lawyer, Lord Brougham.25 In his defense of
British Queen Caroline on the charge of adultery, Brougham stated that:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons…is
his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.26
This statement according to Freedman sums up the proper role of the advocate—
to take the client’s side with unstinting vigor, whatever the consequences.
According to Freedman, Brougham’s critics are wrong to see him as
irresponsible, arrogant, and self-serving for his speech and action in Queen
Caroline’s case. Brougham was, rather, a great man because he sought justice
throughout his career, particularly in his pursuit of the abolition of slavery.27
Freedman overlooks the question whether either Brougham’s political positions
or his extreme statement of the adversary ethic are relevant to, let alone
justificatory to, his actual conduct as a lawyer. Brougham’s “defense” of Queen
Caroline put her at needless risk for her life and fomented anti-Catholic hatred
and even violence against the King and others on account of the King’s first,
clandestine marriage to a Catholic.28
Caroline was the victim of an “advocate” more concerned with advancing his
political interests than with protecting the interests of his client. The story of the
correspondence and provocations encouraged by Brougham through his whiphand representation of Caroline has been told in detail.29 It involves the
subjugation of his client’s interests to a perception of justice as political victory.
Had Brougham pursued his client’s interests rather than his own political
program, which would be benefitted by damaging the King’s reputation, the
proceedings would not have commenced at all; in this regard Brougham went so
far as to hide from his client that there had been a settlement offer to her from

24. Id.
25. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1213, 1213–14 (2005).
26. JOSEPH NIGHTINGALE, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821).
27. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1214.
28. Id. at 1215.
29. Id. at 1214.
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the King.30 As to the speech itself, Brougham acknowledged later that it was
not intended as a summary of the proper role of an advocate; it was simply a
threat—as the graymail for which Freedman praised him.31 Freedman praises
Brougham’s use of “graymail” (the threat of exposing the details of the King’s
private affairs) to intimidate Caroline’s prosecutors into dropping their case.32
But the graymail itself was necessitated by Brougham’s misuse of his client for
his own political purposes.
Freedman was a revolutionary in the overt sense that he wanted to dismantle
and replace what he saw as an illegitimate legal, constitutional, and political
order.33 CLS and CRT are embodiments of this rejection of legitimacy; they rest
on the presumption that American law is so deeply rooted in oppression that it
cannot be reformed.34 They call for wholesale rejection and replacement of that
law, and even replacement of the Western conception of law itself.35 Their goal
is a narrative-based practice of adjudication that takes into account the particular
experiences of specific persons, determined, for example, by their race.36 That
is, they take the maxim that law entails treating like cases alike as a starting point
for denying the “likeness” of cases according to their own categories of relevant
actors (e.g., race, sex, and sexual orientation). Law then becomes something
other than itself because it must be perceived, shaped, and applied according to
postmodern rules eschewing traditional conceptions of merit, fault, and
blameworthiness in favor of treatment according to categories of victimization.
Justice, then, becomes what supports the narrative of oppression and the cause
of bringing down existing structures.
III. POLITICAL THEOLOGY
How did such uncompromising critiques of the American legal system
become part of the academic mainstream? Much of the utopian pressure on law
has been secular in tone and justification. But I want to focus here on its
specifically Christian elements. Why? First, because radical Christian critiques
predate their secular corollaries. Second, because a certain strand of Christian
lawyering, specifically the blending of religious and political activism, has been

30. Michael Ariens, Brougham’s Ghost, 35 NORTHERN ILL. L. REV. 263, 267–74 (2015).
31. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1217.
32. The case was held in the House of Lords as part of attempts to pass a law that would have
stripped Caroline of her title; proponents of the bill, which passed in the Lords, let the matter drop
without pursuing it in the House of Commons.
33. Freedman was a member of the pro-Communist National Lawyers Guild and, while his
characterizations of his involvement in that group varied, he openly supported radical action to
produce revolutionary change. See Silber, supra note 22, at 1140–46.
34. Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality & the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the
Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REV. 787, 797, 803 (1999).
35. Id. at 803.
36. Id. at 806.
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crucial to the degradation of law in America, largely by convincing people that,
in Eric Voegelin’s terms, we can “immanentize the eschaton” or bring about a
secular version of heaven on earth.37
Christian legal activists, like their secular counterparts, would deny that they
are seeking utopia; perfection is, after all, unattainable almost by definition. But
this is no answer to the charge that they seek more from law than it can by nature
provide by seeking more justice, and of a specific sort, than human nature and
the nature of justice itself allow. Neither does it answer the charge that they are
so engrossed in the task of radical critique, of undermining imperfect structures,
that they have lost sight of both the fragility and the necessity of legal order.
A political theology may be defined merely as an attempt to put the dictates
of one’s religion into political practice. But the point of a political theology is
to make one’s theological beliefs concrete, that is, to apply religious precepts in
a way that transforms society through political means. Examples of political
theology are legion, though they have their roots in political, rather than
narrowly legal arguments. Gustavo Gutierrez, a leader in the Marxist/Catholic
movement of Liberation Theology, denied that his movement sought political
liberation as, in effect, the coming of the kingdom of God.38 But his explanation
is telling:
The growth of the Kingdom is a process which occurs historically in
liberation, insofar as liberation means a greater fulfillment of man.
Liberation is a precondition for the new society, but this is not all it is.
While liberation is implemented in liberating historical events, it also
denounces their limitations and ambiguities, proclaims their
fulfillment, and impels them effectively towards total communion.
This is not an identification. Without liberating historical events, there
would be no growth of the Kingdom. But the process of liberation
will not have conquered the very roots of oppression and the
exploitation of man by man without the coming of the Kingdom,
which is above all a gift.39
In effect, for Gutierrez, political liberation is a necessary condition for
salvation. The coming of the Kingdom is a gift, but that gift is in addition to, or
a kind of capstone to, the growth of the Kingdom resulting from liberation. In
this, liberation theology mimics an earlier, protestant movement—that of the
“Social Gospel.” The Social Gospel movement was (and is) “post-millennial”
in that it sees establishment of the kingdom of God on Earth as a necessary
precursor to the second coming of Christ.40 Indeed, according to its most

37. See ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 166–67 (1952).
38. GUSTAVO A. GUTIÉRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 176–77 (Sr. Caridad Inda & John
Eagleson eds., trans., 1973).
39. Id. at 177.
40. WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 226 (1917).
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influential theorist, Walter Rauschenbusch, “The Kingdom of God is humanity
organized according to the will of God.”41 Existing both in the present and in
the future, the Kingdom of God is not only eschatological reality; it is “always
coming, always pressing in on the present, always big with possibility, and
always inviting immediate action.”42 To establish the Kingdom of God, social
movements must act to “redeem” social life from bigotry and all forms of
oppression, including private property.43
Political theology, then, naturally leads to radical activism. Such activism
itself may eschew theology properly understood in favor of ideology, but the
terrestrial results are much the same. Russell Kirk defined ideology as “a
dogmatic political theory which is an endeavor to substitute secular goals and
doctrines for religious goals and doctrines; and which promises to overthrow
present dominations so that the oppressed may be liberated. Ideology’s promises
are…’political messianism.’”44 The ideologue promises salvation in this world
through human action that harnesses the holy to terrestrial ends. Ideology is
religious in nature, but it substitutes demands that the state bring salvation to the
here and now for a metaphysical understanding of human limitations and the
human yearning for an existence available only in the presence of God. In
Augustinian terms, ideology mistakenly sees law as a means by which we can
leave the sinful City of Man and enter the eternal City of God.45
IV. SHAFFER’S CHRISTIAN CALL TO DISORDER
Shaffer has had a long, selfless career seeking to act as what he calls a
Christian Gentleman in his professional life.46 One might say that Shaffer serves
as a kind of prophet, calling on the rich and powerful to repent and return to the
ways of the Lord.47 Indeed, Shaffer self-consciously seeks to pattern his life,
and convince others to pattern their lives, on that of the biblical prophets.48

41. Id. at 142.
42. Id. at 141.
43. Id. at 143.
44. RUSSEL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 5 (1993).
45. RUSSEL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 163 (4th ed. 2004).
Augustine rejected these notions. The state is governed by men, subject to sinful
appetites—enslaved especially by the lust of power. On looking at the history of any
people, one perceives how, despite heroic endeavors by some few good and strong men,
any state soon is riddled with corruption. Put no faith in salvation through political
order.
Id.
46. Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be Saved? The Theological Legal Ethics of Thomas
Shaffer, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 347–48 (1993).
47. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 469, 469 (2003).
48. See id.; Silber, supra note 22, at 1130 (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, A Consideration of
the Political Thought of the Early Jews (Apr. 11, 1951) (unpublished A.B. honors thesis, Harvard
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Shaffer’s argument is rooted in the useful truism that too many people today
are too materially comfortable to pay sufficient attention to justice—both its
necessity for a good life and its perpetual lack, particularly in dealings with the
poor.49 Part of the broader problem clearly has to do with power and its potential
misuse; as Shaffer puts it, “[l]ethal state power evicts my clients from their
homes, garnishes their wages, and deports them.”50 Shaffer’s rather extreme
restatement of the problem of power owes much to his agreement with the
statement that “[t]he modern nation-state is a fundamentally unjust and corrupt
set of institutions whose primary function is to preserve the interests of the ruling
class, by coercive and violent means if necessary...And...there will always come
a time when it is necessary.”51
Given that, in Shaffer’s view, the cards are stacked definitively against the
poor, as the powerful use law for their own ends, what solution does he offer?
Like Freedman, Shaffer rejects the mere correction of abuses; after all, he sees
the nation as fundamentally unjust and corrupt. What is needed, then, is
prophecy—religiously inspired activism.
Here Shaffer cites Walter
Brueggemann, who argues that prophecy means to show “that a thinkable
alternative can be imagined, characterized, and lived in.”52 Shaffer’s prophecy,
then, is political-theological. The link between theology, politics, and ideology
and law is found in the specific context of ancient Israel. As Shaffer argues, “the
biblical prophets should be read in reference not only to observation and
intuition but to the social, political, and economic system established in the
Torah—an ‘ideal pattern of economic life embodied in the Law’”53 Ancient
Israel is Shaffer’s explicit (if idealized) model; one he seeks to reconstitute in
modernity.
When the Prophets spoke of justice, those to whom they spoke knew
what the prophets meant; they shared a Jewish passion for justice.
They shared in their families their pondering about what to do about
widows and orphans and immigrants. The prophets spoke at home.
And they were among a priestly people, reminding a priestly people
of the mandate the Lord had given their family and their families to
proclaim Jewish justice to the nations.54
Ancient Israel, for Shaffer, is more than an interesting historical oddity. It is
a model, and more than a model, for in a sense Israel, its problems, and its call

University) (on file with the Pusey Library, Harvard University)). Freedman himself wrote an
honors thesis contending “that early Jewish thought was largely ‘political.’” Id.
49. Shaffer, supra note 47, at 470.
50. Id. at 474.
51. Id. at 473 (internal citations omitted).
52. Id. at 469.
53. Id. at 481.
54. Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 521, 529 (2003).
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to prophecy, always is with us. In Shaffer’s view, prophets around the world
and up to the present day are called “to challenge, criticize, and subvert legal
power in Israel.”55 Shaffer continues, “This is the way the God of the Bible set
up the law—in perpetual tension. Order on one end, subversion on the other.”56
Such tension may be a creative and even essential means of conservation.57
Shaffer’s radical political argument relates directly to lawyers because, he
argues, “biblical prophets are sources of legal ethics...the biblical prophets were
lawyers more than anything else.”58 Shaffer mixes law, religion, and politics in
pursuit of radical transformation. He laments that “[m]aybe one reason
[American lawyer-prophets] do not get put in our legal-ethics texts is that they
are too stridently focused, as their biblical counterparts were, on the practice of
law (the practice of biblical prophecy) as communal concern for social
justice….[they] aim to be relentlessly radical.”59 The legal structures Shaffer
points to as proper objects of radical transformation are numerous and central to
the structure of society: rules governing families, land ownership, relations with
strangers and visitors, and rules properly aimed at opposing profiteering money
lenders and other exploiters.60
Shaffer presents a radical, activist antinomianism. His prophets “sought
social revolution and called for transformation….When they were lawyers, they
practiced law against order.”61 Law is practiced against order when used to
transform society and undermine antecedents of legality such as like treatment
for like cases (e.g., across class boundaries). More than anything, Shaffer is
preaching against the rule of tradition—of settled norms not susceptible to direct
political action. He bemoans that “communal life has not only become private
and unpolitical; it has also become ‘peripheral.’ Our worshiping communities
are not at the center of things as much as they once were.”62 The answer, then,
is full integration of political theology with law.
V. THE DANGERS OF LAWYERLY THEOLOGY
Shaffer’s views on law and theology are well summed up by the
announcement for a conference on law and religion held in 2017. The
announcement summarizes an allegory taken from Shaffer’s American Lawyers

55. Shaffer, supra note 47, at 475.
56. Id. at 476.
57. See, e.g, EDMUND BURKE, REVOLUNTIONARY WRITINGS: REFELECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND THE FIRST LETTER ON A REGICIDE PEACE 23 (Iain Hampsher-Monk
ed., Cambridge, 2014) (1790) (“A state without the means of some change is without the means of
its conservation.”).
58. Shaffer, supra note 47, at 469.
59. Shaffer, supra note 54, at 521–22.
60. Shaffer, supra note 47, at 481.
61. Id. at 477.
62. Shaffer, supra note 54, at 532.

12

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69:1

and their Communities.63 Here we encounter Shaffer’s vision of a downtown
street:
On one side of the street is a house of worship, on the other is a
courthouse. According to Shaffer, law schools train lawyers to look
at the religious congregation from the courthouse—that is to analyze
the problems the religious congregation creates for the law. Law
schools ignore the possibility that there might be a view of the
courthouse from the house of worship. Prophetic witness is
discounted in law teaching. Our part of the academy, more than any
other, has systematically discouraged and disapproved of invoking the
religious tradition as important or even interesting. It ignores the
community of the faithful so resolutely that even its students who have
come to law school from the community of the faithful learn to look
at the [religious congregation] from the courthouse, rather than at the
courthouse from [the religious congregation].64
In this passage, we encounter Shaffer’s argument that the law, in a separate
building from religion, may be viewed in a different light from outside its own
walls. That light will show the law’s flaws and the need for lawyers themselves
to choose new standards of conduct. But Shaffer does not seek to understand
the law from the vantage point of the church; rather, he sees law and church as
intertwined within an atmosphere that is overwhelmingly political.
Shaffer quotes Randy Cohen with approval:
The difference between ethics and politics seems to me
artificial…Often the only way to achieve an individual ethical goal is
through group endeavor—i.e., politics….An ethics that
eschewed…nominally political questions would not be ethics at all,
but mere rule-following. It would be the ethics of the slave dealer,
advocating that one always be honest about a slave’s health and always
pay bills promptly.65
The lawyer who refuses to abandon the distinction between group endeavor and
politics, and who merely serves clients within the system, according to Cohen
and Shaffer, has the ethics of a “slave dealer.”66
It is true that law and religion occupy different buildings, in Shaffer’s terms,
within that city in which we as Americans, and as inheritors of the intertwined

63. RELIGIOUS CRITIQUES OF LAW, HERBERT AND ELINOR NOOTBAAR INST. ON L.,
RELIGION & ETHICS, PEPP. SCH. OF L. (2017), available at https://law.pepperdine.edu/nootbaarinstitute/annual-conference/brochures/brochure17.pdf.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Shaffer, supra note 47, at 531.
66. Id. (citing Randy Cohen, The Politics of Ethics: By Identifying Ethics with Civic Virtue,
We Create an Ethics of the Left, THE NATION, Apr. 8, 2002, at 21).

2020]

The Lost Virtue of Humility

13

Anglo-American traditions of law and religion, dwell.67 Moreover, both
buildings are close enough and important enough that what happens in each, and
especially what the denizens of each do when they enter the public square,
affects us all. But the buildings remain separate for good reason; law and
religion, like law and politics, each have their own institutions, beliefs, and
practices guiding conduct within their spheres of authority. Importantly, the
purpose of those trained in the law is different from, and aimed at lower, more
basic goods, than that for which the house of worship by nature exists. From a
Christian perspective, lawyers and ministers seek the same end-goals of virtue
in this life and beatitude in the next. But where the house of worship by nature
forms communities in which people learn to live the Gospel, law at best can only
help the house of worship by protecting it against wrongdoers, including an
overreaching, intolerant state and activist lawyers who work to undermine the
settled rules necessary for any community to exist.
Order is the first need of all. Without settled rules regarding what we can
expect from one another—what we may use and how, where we may go and
what we may do there, for example—we will not be able to go about our lives.
Our every move may bring conflict and even violence. Classical liberal theorists
with their “state of nature” theory did not describe actual circumstances under
which people generally lived but rather the necessity of settled rules for social
and political life. Those same thinkers understood that the customary rules of
pre-political life must be solidified into the rule of law if sustained liberty is to
be possible. In this they, like the framers of our own Constitution, were building
on long-sustained understandings of the importance of stability for human
flourishing—an understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas thought required extreme
caution before moving to replace even bad rulers.68 Bad rulers—and bad laws—
may be replaced by even worse ones or, what is worst of all, chaos.
The importance of stability is highlighted by law’s own limited nature.
Society, like those who make it up, always will fail to achieve true justice and,
given free reign, may well inflict extreme injustice even with law, let alone
without it. Augustine highlights law’s limitations by noting the inevitability of
injustice even on fundamental issues. He points to the “pitiable predicament of
men who sit in judgment on other men without being able to read their
consciences[.]”69 Judges in Augustine’s time would struggle, even engaging in
torture as they attempted to prove guilt or innocence, often making mistakes.70
Law and legal procedures remain radically imperfect and attempts to make
them more perfect have caused the system itself to bend, if not break. Refusing

67. See HAROLD BERMAN, FAITH & ORDER 230–34 (1993).
68. AQUINAS, supra note 17, at 1023.
69. Augustine, City of God, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS 149 (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan
Lockwood O’Donovan eds. 1999).
70. Id.
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to convict a rapist because his “cultural norms” make it unjust to hold him
responsible for his actions undermines justice for his victim (in this case a victim
who subsequently attempted suicide) and the system of justice for society as a
whole.71 More generally, a hyper-complex legal structure implementing an
increasingly complex set of laws and regulations, all aimed at achieving evergreater levels of fairness, has undermined actual persons’ chances for reasonably
just treatment. For evidence we may look to the fact that the vast majority of
criminal cases today never even go to trial; innocent and guilty alike are herded
into a system in which they must “bargain” with an increasingly powerful state
to determine whether or how much they will be punished.72
In the end, the attempt to use law as a tool of social reconstruction destroys it.
For example, demands that lawsuits and political action be used to force changes
in federal regulations so as to promote a just society, along with attempts by
judges and legislatures to impose strict and detailed rules on crime and tort have
given us, not more justice, but less law. Everything is subject to plea bargains
and settlements, not trial. Radical lawyers may see this as progress because it
undermines legal forms in favor of progressive agreement rooted in conceptions
of social justice. But the sides really are not even, especially for a poor person
whose case is of insufficient political use to attract a powerful “public interest”
advocate. The state retains the power and those who are politically connected
secure more “justice” than those who are not. 73
Law is necessary in that we cannot live together in even relative peace and
order without it. But the law is highly imperfect, visiting pain upon the innocent
even as it leaves the guilty free to commit more crimes. Augustine pointed this
out and went on to argue that it does not mean that we should give up on the law,
or that we should seek to perfect it. Rather, we must recognize law’s limits,
value it for what it does achieve, and look elsewhere for additional assistance in
seeking peace.74
The law which is made to govern states seems to you to make many
concessions and to leave unpunished things which are avenged
nonetheless by divine providence—and rightly so. But because it does

71. Normandie: jugé pour le viol d’une lycéene, il est acquitté, LA MANCHE LIBRE (Nov. 22,
2018, 9:33 AM), https://www.lamanchelibre.fr/actualite-620903-normandie-juge-pour-le-viol-dune-lyceenne-il-est-acquitte.
72. See generally Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 949 (1986) (providing an early review of arguments for and against plea
bargaining).
73. David Von Drehle, It pays to be rich. Just look at the lurid case of Jeffrey Epstein, WASH.
POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/it-pays-to-be-rich-justlook-at-the-lurid-case-of-jeffrey-epstein/2018/12/04/875d6198-f7f3-11e8-8c9a860ce2a8148f_story.html?utm_term=.b43a22f63497.
74. Augustine states, “Mistakes are unavoidable, but so is the duty of judgment.” Augustine,
supra note 69, at 148–49.
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not do all things, it does not thereby follow that what it does do is to
be condemned.75
Augustine’s answer to the tragedy of law is not itself law; nor is it a rejection
of law. It is an addition to the law in the form of mercy. Augustine does not
call the law into question, but merely recognizes its limits. He notes that Jesus,
in saying to those who would stone the adulteress that he who is without sin
should cast the first stone, is not denying law. Jesus here recognizes the justice
of law. Rather than call it into question, he adds to it recognition of our own
sinfulness, a recognition that should bring out in those with the power to punish
a mercy that too often remains dormant.76 As Augustine wrote to one prosecutor,
“There is good, then, in your severity which works to secure our tranquility, and
there is good in our [priestly] intercession which works to restrain your
severity.”77
Augustine’s “solution” to law’s imperfection is highly limited; mercy cannot
replace justice, instead only mitigating its severity, and it must be applied
persistently and watched over lest man’s imperfections delegitimize mercy
itself. Nevertheless, mercy remains necessary and applicable to regular legal
process. For Augustine, mercy is the part of the Church, the role of bishops and
priests as intercessors, adding to, rather than replacing, the role of the adversaries
in judicial process.78 Even mercy, when applied by men, is highly imperfect;

75. Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note
69, at 114.
76. Augustine, Letter 153, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note 69, at 122. As
Augustine provides:
[A]lthough the prosecutor and the defender are two different persons, and the role of
intercessor is not the same as that of judge—it would take too long, and is not necessary
in this speech to discourse on these various duties—the very avengers of crime, who are
not to be influenced by their personal anger but are to act as agents of the law, and those
who enforce the law against proved injuries done to others, not to themselves, as judges
should do, all these quail before the divine judgment, recalling that they have need of the
mercy of God for their own sins, and they do not think they do an injury to their office if
they show mercy to those over whom they have the lawful power of life and
death….[T]hey asked what [Jesus] would command for [the adultress] he answered: “He
that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.” John 8:3-7.
Id.
77. Id. at 127.
78. Augustine observes:
We do not in any way approve the faults which we wish to see corrected, nor do we wish
wrong-doing to go unpunished because we take pleasure in it; we pity the man while
detesting the deed or crime, and the more the vice displeases us, the less do we want the
culprit to die unrepentant. It is easy and simple to hate evil men because they are evil,
but uncommon and dutiful to love them because they are men; thus, in one and the same
person you disapprove the guilt and approve the nature, and you thereby hate the guilt
with a more just reason because by it the nature which you love is defiled. Therefore, he
who makes war on the crime in order to free the man is not involved in a share of the
wrong-doing, but, rather, of human feeling. Moreover, there is no other place but this
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priests, too, may believe lies, misjudge character, and be mistaken regarding
facts and circumstances. But law tempered by mercy (seen in today’s system in
the pardoning power) is the best we can hope for in this life, within the City of
Man.
Here it may seem that I am merely making a great deal out of Augustine’s
recognition of the imperfections of criminal procedure and the necessity of
mercy within a society that recognizes the universality of human sin. But this
extends to what I would insist is a separate realm—politics, and what properly
results from politics, namely, public policy. For Augustine also recognized the
limitations of law to achieve good public policy. Thus, he famously
recommended against laws punishing prostitution because they would be
impossible of proper enforcement and engage the state in breaking up even
healthy social relations (something particularly of danger in a time before police
forces).79 Thus, again, a tragic recognition of the limits of law in seeking justice
and the common good (peace, including in eternal life) is necessary for such
good as can be achieved in this life.80
One might engage here in an extensive discussion of the proper forms of
public policy, be they liberal, conservative, socialist, or libertarian. But my point
is precisely that such a discussion misses the point. No political system will
establish a truly just society because no such society is attainable in this life.
Disagreements concerning particular policy choices, providing they are
peaceful, are in fact healthy—they evidence a desire and practice of public
discourse aimed at the public good. But they must be engaged in within an
understanding of the limited capacity of law. Law cannot bear the weight of
policies aimed at enforcing any particular vision of society; it at best can
maintain public peace while more natural, local, pre-legal groups bear the
greatest responsibility for helping their members work out their own lives.81

life for correcting morals; whatever anyone has sought out for himself in this life, the
same will he have after it. Consequently, we are forced by our love for humankind to
intercede for the guilty lest they end this life by punishment, only to find that punishment
does not end with this life.
Id. at 120.
79. See David A. J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral
Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1211 n.89 (1979).
80. Augustine notes:
In this life the wrong of evil possessors is endured and among them certain laws are
established which are called civil laws, not because they bring men to make a good use
of their wealth, but because those who make bad use of it become thereby less injurious.
This comes about either because some of them become faithful and fervent—and these
have a right to all things—or because those who live among them are not hampered by
their evil deeds, but are tested until they come to that City where they are heirs to eternity,
where the just alone have a place, the wise alone leadership, and those who are there
possess what is truly their own.
Augustine, Letter 93, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note 69, at 13031.
81. This is merely a limited restatement of the principle of subsidiarity.
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Thus, a humble recognition of law’s limits, combined with a humble recognition
of the capacity of and need for other social forms and norms to further the
common good, is necessary for the achievement of a decent, stable, and lasting
society.
VI. MRPC: A SYSTEM REQUIRING AND ALLOWING FOR HUMILITY
Discussions of political theology and the City of God do not transition easily
into an examination of the MRPC. Nor is it clear why or how one would look
to the MRPC as a source of virtue, let alone the virtue of humility. But my goal
in examining the MRPC is quite limited: to show that even much generalized,
low-level norms intended to protect the profession of law support and require
humility on the part of lawyers. Indeed, the MRPC illustrates how humility is
an integral lawyerly virtue—one necessary for engaging in the profession with
even a modicum of personal responsibility and recognition of our duty to the
common good.
At a superficial level, it would be difficult to find much in the MRPC that
supports a call to humility. There is competency and diligence (Preamble, 4 and
Rule 1.1);82 providing guidance and care for clients under a disability;83 and
acting in the role of advisor.84 All these standards of conduct laid out in the
MRPC seem to emphasize the need for lawyers to be self-possessed, competent,
and willing to take the lead in providing service.
Section 6 of the Preamble goes further. Here the MRPC urges lawyers to
“seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service.”85 This section also urges lawyers to “cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, [and] employ that knowledge in
reform of the law.”86 In addition to these calls to reform the system, Section 6
calls on lawyers to “further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the
rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.”87 That is, the MRPC directs lawyers to take on roles as educators of
the public as a whole, motivating them to embrace and support juridical
democracy. The lawyer’ duties, according to Section 6, go beyond teaching and
motivating to using their own “civic influence to ensure equal access to our
system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot

82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 4, r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (regarding a
lawyer’s duties toward a client with diminished capacity).
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (requiring a lawyer
to provide candid advice and, in rendering that advice, consider as many factors relevant to the
client’s situation as possible).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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afford or secure adequate legal counsel.”88 In sum, lawyers, at least in the eyes
of the MRPC, are leading citizens with the right and duty to martial public forces
for the public interest, which is identified with a powerful, respected legal
system.
The duties spelled out in the MRPC’s conception of the lawyer as public
citizen rest on the notion that lawyers do or at least should know what is best for
the justice system, for the rule of law, and for the citizenry. Regardless of its
truth or value, this statement clearly is a call to pride—to an expansive vision
and to the application of this vision to the public at large. But this call to pride
is, or at least should be, shaped, mitigated, and at times trumped by the systemic
necessity for lawyerly humility. Lawyers’ core duty to provide service to clients
whose goals are rightfully deemed paramount and to be determined by
themselves (within the confines of the law) brings with it a set of requirements
that point to the necessity of the virtue of humility.
Broadly understood, the MRPC points toward an understanding of humility
as an excellence appropriate and even necessary for lawyers. To begin with, the
MRPC is based in a relationship of service. Rule 1.2 makes this clear in stating
that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.”89 The lawyer does not get to dictate to the client what the client
should be attempting to accomplish. The lawyer’s job is to help clients pursue
their own goals. This seems obvious enough, but we should keep in mind that
it points toward the lawyer subjecting his or her own judgment on a very
important, directive set of issues, to that of the client. No Broughams need apply
to the bar of responsible lawyers.
The Rules’ preamble, also rooted in the nature of the profession, points to the
need for lawyers to “demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who
serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials.”90
This imperative is reinforced in a number of provisions, including those
requiring meritorious claims and contentions (3.1),91 efforts to expedite
litigation (3.2),92 candor toward the tribunal (3.3),93 fairness toward opposing
parties and counsel (3.4),94 and respect for the rights of third persons (4.4).95
All these considerations go to the need for lawyers to respect those with whom
they deal, particularly in litigation, but in all other aspects of law as well. Worth
emphasizing here is the sense in which this respect rests on, as it also should

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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reinforce, a basic humility on the part of the lawyer that itself is rooted in the
nature and limits of law. Perhaps some or even most attorneys in the midst of
daily practice view MRPC-type rules as mere guidelines for avoiding contempt
citations. Nevertheless, virtues themselves are dispositions born of conduct; that
is, they are habits rooted in action as well as rational consideration. A
disposition of respect, even if often rooted in fear, combines easily with
acceptance of the overall goals of the system in which one serves.
Thus, the imperative of judicial efficiency and recognition that bad conduct
endangers the system on which one (and one’s clients) relies encourages one to
work to keep the system functioning, in part through humble self-restraint and
recognition of the rights of others. One restrains oneself from following one’s
instinct to engage in scorched-earth tactics that may produce victory but will
undermine the legal system. One also acts out of respect for the judgment, rights,
and even authority of others, especially judges and rules of discovery and the
like which are designed to maintain the system and further its internal goals.
More generally, the lawyer’s service role demands humility. For example, to
believe one’s client at times requires suspension of one’s judgment. One is
giving the benefit of the doubt—at times even when that doubt is relatively
great—to one’s client. One does not simply follow one’s own reason but adapts
it to find the reason in one’s client’s story. This can go for contract negotiations,
for example, but comes out clearly when one’s client is accused of a crime and
presents a defense that seems doubtful. Sometimes, of course, the client is lying
to the lawyer. But sometimes the lawyer simply has to work harder to find the
truth in the client’s words. And that is as much a matter of humility—of putting
oneself in another’s shoes and of restraining one’s incredulity—as it is raw
analytical ability. Here the virtue of humility may be seen as part of the popular
notion of lawyering according to the ethic of friendship.96
In addition, of course, one must accept the client’s own goals as the goals of
the representation, even when those goals seem sub-optimal or even foolish.
When the client really wants to hold on to a relationship, an asset, or a company
the lawyer thinks not worth the cost, the lawyer’s duty is not to work against the
client’s goals. The lawyer often should advise against certain actions because
of their nature or consequences, but when the goal is within the law, the lawyer,
in the end, must serve it, or step aside. To go no further, then, it seems essential
that a lawyer who seeks to live up to his or her responsibilities, and who seeks
to be of service to clients, must practice a basic humility in accepting the client
as that client is found, stories, goals, warts, and all, and serve that client. This is
humble work, but no less worthwhile for all that. Moreover, this lawyer must
respect and work to preserve the system of law—its processes and the basic

96. See, e.g.,Thomas L. Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship in the American
Professions, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 623 (1986).
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coherence of its presumptions—in order to prevent the breakdown of a system
necessary for the pursuit of justice for his or her clients.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is natural that we yearn for a better existence, in which the pursuit of justice
replaces that form of instrumentalism that sees sterile formalism as lawyers’
only concern. When one adds the Christian duty to pursue a preference for the
poor, one can experience a genuine pull toward law as transformation. But when
one adds to this a radical political theology one collapses the distinction between
eschatology and daily practice. The result is an identification of the good with
specific political goals, whether presented as the embodiment of heaven or
merely as “the best we can get” in this life.
Augustine was aware of the tragic imperfections of legal process in our fallen
world. The humility of his vision of law in the City of Man, where self-love is
the rule, lies at the heart of traditional conceptions of the lawyer’s ethical role.97
Within the American tradition, with its religious roots, the lawyer had a kind of
humility forced upon him. The original Puritans (and some others) wanted to
dispense with lawyers altogether out of concern that they would foment disputes
and encourage “going to law.”98 The early role of lawyers consisted of serving
as an advocate for those who must go to law and as a servant in a public role
arranging rules and institutions in accordance with a higher law accessible to
divines and (“the better sort” of) laymen as well as themselves.
The shift from Augustine to Brougham is a shift from humility to pride—from
service to existing forms, prudently defending against abuses to the drive to
transform society into something more perfectly just according to a particular
ideological vision—whatever the cost to actual persons, including one’s own
clients. It also is a shift from acceptance of imperfection to a determination to
ignore essential aspects of human nature in pursuit of political victory.
The new lawyers’ ethic is based not just in pride, but also in a self-willed
ignorance. An ethic that justifies lying for clients as “evening the score” with
supposedly unjust structures intentionally ignores the person’s intrinsically
contextual existence. Victory for one may mean loss for us all. It also may mean
true loss for the client if it means destroying that client’s non-legal interests and
relationships. Finally, this focus on victory can be shown to have caused severe
harm to individual parties in their dealings with powerful actors—including the
state. By upping the stakes in court, the rebel lawyer has priced the vast majority

97. Mary T. Clark, Augustine on Justice, 9 REVUE D’ÉTUDES AUGUSTINIENNES ET
PATRISTIGUES 87, 88 (1963).
98. Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and Community in
Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 938 (1995).
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of clients out of any chance to an even “fight” with those who can afford more
skilled and more extensive representation.99
Aristotle pointed to justice as the highest virtue. Augustine pointed out that
justice means the proper order of the soul—and only from that—the proper
ordering of society. Such ordering is rooted in the love of God and—from that—
doing justice and charity to one’s neighbor and the commonwealth. I am easy
on such terms to sin, either by harming or by failing to help others.100 The
highest law is indeed the law of love, which we selfish persons disobey regularly.
That being the case, the “solution” to social injustice is within us and our own
actions as lawyers and as citizens. It will not be found in the attempt to make
over society in our own image of heaven, let alone by twisting the law to our
own ends. That way lies the collapse of social order and with it the possibility
of peace and mercy in this life.101

99. Luz E. Herrera, Training Lawyer-Entrepreneurs, 89 DENVER U. L. REV. 887, 894 (2012)
(noting that with an average wage of $25 an hour, most Americans are priced out of lawyers costing
even just $125–150 an hour)
100. Clark, supra note 97, at 89.
101. Id. at 94.
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